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INTRODUCTION
C ONSIDER the following hypothetical. An entrepreneur wants
to establish a charity to improve the health of children in de-
veloping countries. Specifically, the business plan envisions devel-
oping technology to improve the quality and supply of water in Af-
rican nations. Running this charity will require the entrepreneur's
time and effort, for which she would like to be compensated out of
the funds that the organization obtains from donations or revenues
from any sales made in developed countries.
Suppose the entrepreneur is willing to take a fixed salary as
compensation and promises to abstain from distributing the char-
ity's profits (defined as net revenue, that is, gross revenue minus
costs including her salary) to herself or her employees. Then she
may charter her organization as a nonprofit firm under state law.
The defining feature of a nonprofit firm is that it cannot distribute
net revenue to any affiliated persons or employees, a restriction
known as the "nondistribution constraint. '
An important benefit of organizing as a nonprofit firm is that if
the firm also benefits the public and thereby complies with the
state law definition of a "community-benefit" organization,2 the
firm will obtain various state tax advantages, such as an exemption
from sales and property taxes.' If the firm also meets a substantially
similar community-benefit criterion under Section 501(c)(3) of the
federal tax code, it will obtain important federal tax benefits. These
include an exemption from the corporate income tax and, more
importantly, the ability of donors to deduct their donations from
'See James J. Fishman & Stephen Schwarz, Nonprofit Organizations: Cases and
Materials 2-3 (2d ed. 2000).
2 See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 10.20.005 (2006); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 617.0301 (West 2007);
805 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 105/103-05 (West Supp. 2007).
See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 29.45.030 (2006) (extending tax exemption to properties
used for nonprofit religious, charitable, cemetery, hospital, or educational purposes);
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 196.012 (West 2007) (defining an exempt use of property for pur-
poses of property tax computation as any predominant or exclusive utilization of said
property for, inter alia, charitable purposes); id. § 212.08(5)(q) (West 2007) (offering
tax credit to qualified entities that make community contributions to certain eligible
program sponsors such as "nonprofit community-based development organiza-
tion[s]"); 35 111. Comp. Stat. Ann. 205/15-65 (West 2006) (exempting property from
taxation when its use is charitable or beneficent and its owner is a charitable organiza-
tion incorporated anywhere in the United States).
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their taxable income Since our hypothetical entrepreneur's plan
satisfies the community-benefit criterion, it will enjoy all of these
tax breaks.
Suppose, however, that the entrepreneur is unwilling to take a
fixed salary as compensation. She would like to distribute some of
the charity's net revenue to herself. For example, if the charity
raises $10 million from donors but manages to develop a water fil-
tration system at a cost of only $8 million, the charity will make $2
million in profits for the entrepreneur to take home. Why might
the entrepreneur want to take home the profits, and why might
donors permit her to do so? Perhaps the entrepreneur is very tal-
ented and could make a great deal of money at a noncharitable
start-up company. She would have to turn that income down to
form a charity, and while the entrepreneur is kind-hearted, she also
cares about maintaining a comfortable lifestyle. Or perhaps the en-
trepreneur and donors believe she cannot motivate her employees
to work hard unless she can offer them a share of the firm's profits.
Unfortunately, under current law, the entrepreneur cannot es-
tablish her charity as a nonprofit organization. This means that, al-
though her firm continues to provide safe water to poor countries,
and thus otherwise satisfies the community-benefit designation un-
der state law and complies with Section 501(c)(3) of the federal tax
code, it cannot obtain the tax breaks offered to similarly situated
nonprofit firms. This is the case even though such a restriction
means the entrepreneur may not establish a charity at all or that
the charity will not be as productive or efficient. Indeed, this is the
case even though, but for the inability to deduct their donations
from taxable income, donors might prefer to give money to a for-
profit charity.
If our charitable entrepreneur's proposal seems fanciful, con-
sider that Google has recently announced, with great fanfare, that
it will operate the world's first (to our knowledge) "for-profit char-
ity."5 Google's plan appears to be to finance a for-profit business
that will, among other things, develop new technology to improve
'See I.R.C. § 170 (2000).
'See Google.org, Welcome to Google.org-The Philanthropic Arm of Google,
http://google.org (last visited Sept. 22, 2007).
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water supplies in Kenya.6 Google's new enterprise is a charity be-
cause it is devoted to helping others rather than seeking out the
highest rate of monetary return for Google; but it is for-profit be-
cause it can distribute profits from its ventures to employees and
business partners As we will discuss, there are other examples of
organizations devoted to charitable goals that skirt the line be-
tween for-profit and nonprofit. Google's open embrace of the for-
profit model is extreme, but it differs from earlier mixed efforts by
degree rather than by kind.
The problem for for-profit charities is that they forfeit all the
state and federal tax benefits available to nonprofit charities. Al-
though Google has nonetheless decided to establish a for-profit
charity, that charity is partially hobbled by the inability to obtain
these tax benefits. For example, even if the Google charity is suc-
cessful, Google may be reluctant to increase funding of the charity
and the charity may have difficulty raising funds from donors be-
cause contributions to the for-profit Google charity are not de-
ductible. This raises a puzzle. Why should an organization that is
devoted to doing good lose a tax benefit just because it compen-
sates employees with profits rather than with a flat wage? If it turns
out that Google's charitable efforts benefit poor countries more ef-
fectively than those of nonprofits with similar missions, why should
the tax code steer donors to the nonprofits rather than to Google?
The literature contains three explanations for why the nonprofit
form is recognized by the law and receives special tax benefits. The
public goods theory holds that the tax deduction for charitable con-
tributions encourages people to donate to firms that create public
goods and this is more efficient than direct government purchase
or production of public goods with general tax revenues. The
agency theory holds that the nonprofit form solves a problem of
asymmetric information that arises when donors cannot adequately
evaluate the quality of charitable services they would like to pur-
chase. The nondistribution constraint protects these donors from
being taken advantage of by profit-seeking charities. Finally, the
altruism theory holds that the return on tax breaks for the produc-
6Posting of Alix Zwane to Google.org Blog, http://blog.google.org/2007/07/new-
meaning-for-spring-cleaning.html (July 2, 2007, 03:15 EST).
'See Katie Hafner, Philanthropy Google's Way: Not the Usual, N.Y. Times, Sept.
14, 2006, at Al.
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tion of public goods is higher when those tax breaks are targeted at
nonprofit firms than at for-profit firms. The reason is that the non-
profit form attracts entrepreneurs who are altruistic, and altruistic
entrepreneurs convert more of each dollar of tax breaks into public
goods because they derive "warm-glow" consumption value from
producing such goods.
In addition, we discuss and criticize two novel explanations for
why only nonprofit firms should receive tax benefits. One, which
we call the imperfect consumer theory, supposes that consumers
make mistakes when donating money to charities. They may give
money to an organization that pockets donations rather than con-
veying them to the needy. The restriction that charities cannot get
tax breaks if they distribute profits limits the harm from consum-
ers' poor choices by directing consumers to organizations with
fewer options to cheat consumers. Another theory reflects con-
cerns about the administrability of Section 501(c)(3). For-profit
firms, because of the profit motive, are much more likely to lobby
the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") in order to persuade it that
nontraditional charitable activity should qualify for tax breaks un-
der Section 501(c)(3). This may overwhelm the IRS. Requiring ap-
plicants for Section 501(c)(3)-related tax breaks to foreswear dis-
tributing profits reduces this pressure on the IRS.
We will argue that none of these theories answers what we will
call the coupling or linkage question, that is, why a particular tax
benefit designed to promote charitable activities is conditioned on
a particular corporate form (the nonprofit form or, equivalently,
the nondistribution constraint). The public goods theory explains
why the government should use tax breaks-specifically the deduc-
tion for charitable donations-to encourage provision of public
goods but fails to explain why the government should deny such
tax breaks to for-profit firms that produce these goods. The agency
theory explains why people might prefer to donate to a nonprofit
firm but not why nonprofit firms should receive a tax benefit. The
altruism theory may justify tax breaks for nonprofits that produce
public goods, but it relies on questionable assumptions about the
costs and prevalence of altruists to deny the same tax breaks to for-
profits, which might be more efficient at producing public goods.
The imperfect consumer theory cannot explain why traditional
consumer protection laws are insufficient protection against fraud
2007] 2021
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by charities. Finally, the administrability objection ignores simpler
solutions such as charging firms that seek Section 501(c)(3) classifi-
cation a user fee to fund IRS review.
Because none of these theories justifies coupling the nonprofit
form and tax subsidization, coupling should be eliminated. De-
coupling would have two important benefits. First, it would im-
prove the efficiency of services provided by nonprofit firms. For-
mer U.S. Senator Bill Bradley and consultants from McKinsey &
Company have estimated that the nonprofit sector wastes $100 bil-
lion of value annually.' They argue that it is possible to recover ap-
proximately $60 billion of that loss by improving management and
cutting administrative costs.' If the profit incentive explains why
for-profit firms are managed more efficiently than nonprofit firms,
then decoupling might go some way to reducing this waste by al-
lowing charitable entrepreneurs to reward themselves and employ-
ees for efficient delivery of services. To be clear, it might be that
under decoupling for-profit firms provide the services that non-
profit firms previously provided, but the key point is that the same
services would be more efficiently produced than before.
Second, decoupling may encourage a vast increase in the produc-
tion of community-benefit goods and services by for-profit firms.
The demand for such products is strong and growing. According to
researchers, investors increased the amount of assets they have
placed in socially responsible funds-defined as funds that restrict
investments to for-profit companies that engage in socially worthy
activities-by 7% between 2001 and 2003, "as compared to a 4%
drop in all professionally managed assets."'" In 2003, the total in-
vestment was $2.14 trillion, or roughly 11% of total assets under
management in the United States." A large component of these
funds flow to companies producing "environmentally friendly"
products, which accounted for 9.5% of all new product introduc-
tions in 1999.12 Extending the tax break for community-benefit ac-
8See Bill Bradley et al., The Nonprofit Sector's $100 Billion Opportunity, Harv.
Bus. Rev., May 2003, at 94, 102.
'Id. at 98, 100-02.
" Christopher C. Geczy et al., Investing in Socially Responsible Mutual Funds 2 (re-
vised ed. Oct. 2005), http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=416380.
"Id.
2 Matthew J. Kotchen, Green Markets and Private Provision of Public Goods, 114
J. Pol. Econ. 816, 817 (2006).
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tivities from nonprofits to for-profits would substantially accelerate
this trend.
Our Essay is related to an earlier debate about whether or not
nonprofit firms should be taxed like for-profit firms when nonprofit
firms engage in commercial activities. For example, a museum
rents out gallery space for corporate events. The federal govern-
ment's current approach is to tax nonprofits the same as for-profits
when nonprofits engage in commercial activities. Thus, the mu-
seum does not pay taxes on its profits from ticket sales but does (or
at least ought to) pay a tax on profits from the corporate events;
the after-tax profits can be used to subsidize the museum's opera-
tions.'3 This is implemented via the so-called unrelated business in-
come tax ("UBIT") on nonprofits;'4 the purpose of the tax is to de-
prive nonprofits of tax advantages when nonprofits compete
against for-profit firms in commercial markets. 5 The issue we raise
is the flip side of the UBIT debate: should for-profit firms be taxed
like nonprofit firms (or more precisely, be exempt from taxes like
nonprofit firms) when they engage in charitable activities? Our an-
swer is yes, because there is no reason to condition the tax subsidy
for charitable activities on organizational form.6
This Essay is organized as follows. Part I provides background
on nonprofit law and the organization of nonprofit firms. Part II
," See Note, The Macaroni Monopoly: The Developing Concept of Unrelated Busi-
ness Income of Exempt Organizations, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1280, 1281 (1968).
14 I.R.C. § 512(a) (2000).
" See Charles T. Clotfelter, Tax-Induced Distortions in the Voluntary Sector, 39
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 663, 678 (1989); Henry B. Hansmann, Unfair Competition and
the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 75 Va. L. Rev. 605, 606 (1989).
,6 Professor Evelyn Brody has written a related article arguing that the behavior of
nonprofit and for-profit firms is converging because both types of firms face similar
principal-agent problems: between shareholders and managers in the for-profit firm and
between donors and managers in the nonprofit firm. She suggests in passing that this
convergence in behavior might justify similar tax treatment. See Evelyn Brody, Agents
Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the Nonprofit and For-Profit Organ-
izational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 457, 535-36 (1996). But while her argument is
based on fairness, ours is based on efficiency. See also David A. Hyman & William M.
Sage, Subsidizing Health Care Providers Through the Tax Code: Status or Conduct?, 25
Health Aff. W312 (June 20, 2006), http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/25/4W312
(arguing that tax law should subsidize charitable nonprofit firms only to the extent
that their activities benefit the community). Some similar ideas have appeared in the
popular media. See Matthew Richter, Utopia Aflame: The Organizations Established
to Save Humanity Are Dying. Seriously., Stranger, Apr. 27-May 3, 2006,
http://www.thestranger.com/seattle/Content?oid=31985.
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discusses the theories that support coupling and advances our cri-
tique of those theories. Part III addresses some objections to de-
coupling. Part IV discusses the important case of "mixed charities,"
often discussed under the rubric of corporate responsibility. We
conclude with a proposal for reform.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Legal Treatment of Nonprofit Firms
The laws of every state recognize that a firm may either have
for-profit or nonprofit status. A for-profit firm may pay its profits
to the owners of the firm. The key constraint and defining feature
of a nonprofit firm is the nondistribution constraint: the firm may
not pay its profits to the owners of the firm. 7 Instead, the nonprofit
must retain its profits or spend excess revenues on its business (in
which case it does not have profits). To be more concrete, suppose
that an entrepreneur sets up a firm. If the firm is for-profit, the en-
trepreneur, as the sole owner, retains all profits. If the firm is non-
profit, the entrepreneur may not retain the profits, though she may
pay herself a wage. The wage may not be a proxy for profits (for
example, bonuses when profits are high); it must be relatively fixed
and keyed to the market, so that the entrepreneur earns about the
same as an employee would be paid for similar services. For exam-
ple, the entrepreneur who manages a nonprofit may pay herself a
salary equal to the salary received by the manager of a comparable
for-profit firm.
Some states limit the scope of business of nonprofits, but as a
general proposition they permit for-profit firms to compete in the
same market as nonprofits. Thus, we observe for-profit and non-
profit hospitals, for-profit and nonprofit daycare centers, for-profit
and nonprofit publishers, and so forth. Federal law recognizes
nonprofit status and affords nonprofit firms certain benefits so long
as they do not have a commercial purpose. Specifically, under Sec-
tion 501(c)(3) of the tax code, nonprofits may obtain tax breaks so
17 See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 450.2108(3) (West 2002); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 82.136(2) (LexisNexis 2004); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1702.01(C) (LexisNexis Supp.
2007).
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long as they engage in charitable, educational, scientific, or artistic
activities.18
The most visible federal tax benefit for nonprofit firms that have
Section 501(c)(3) status is their freedom from corporate income
taxation. However, one should not overemphasize this benefit.
For-profit firms do not pay corporate income taxes if they, like a
nonprofit, reinvest their excess revenues and have no proper prof-
its. Moreover, under certain conditions-not having more than 100
shareholders and not being traded on a stock exchange-the IRS
permits for-profit firms to elect "pass-through" treatment and
"S ection 501(c) of the tax code grants tax exemptions for two basic categories of
nonprofit organizations. One includes organizations that fall under § 501(c)(3) and
are distinguished by the title "community-benefit," "public-benefit," or more simply
"charitable" organizations. The other category includes all other organizations cov-
ered by § 501(c) and are called "mutual-benefit" organizations or "mutuals" for short.
They are so called because their primary purpose is to serve their members, not the
general public. We use the term "community-benefit" organization interchangeably
with Professor Halperin's (and our) term "public-benefit" organization. Our term
"charitable organization" refers to an entity that transfers resources from a donor to a
beneficiary. Charitable organizations may be a public-benefit organization or a for-
profit organization. But it is unlikely to be a "mutual" because the donor and the
beneficiary typically overlap in a mutual. Mutuals are exempt from corporate income
tax on income generated from services provided to members, but not on income gen-
erated from services provided to nonmembers. See Daniel Halperin, Income Taxation
of Mutual Nonprofits 3-4 (2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia
Law Review Association). Only charitable organizations, however, are eligible for the
charitable tax deduction and, where applicable, the exemption from property and
sales taxes. Id. at 5. (One exception is that in certain cases member contributions to
trade associations may be deductible to members as business expenses. Id. at 4.)
Our analysis focuses on public-benefit organizations, but can be extended to mu-
tual-benefit organizations as well. The latter are also subject to a version of the non-
distribution constraint. In particular, they cannot distribute net earnings to members
as cash (though they can indirectly distribute them by providing additional services to
members). Our basic proposition is that tax breaks should be contingent on preferred
activities and not corporate form. As applied to mutuals, our claim would be that the
corporate income tax exemption for income earned from members should be ex-
tended to the for-profit version of the mutual-benefit organization, also known as the
cooperative, or be denied to the mutual-benefit organization. Interestingly, it can be
argued that existing law already and de facto takes the first route. The reason is that
the cooperative firm can deduct from taxable income certain cash dividends it pays to
members, so-called patronage dividends. Just as the corporate income tax exemption
for mutual-benefit organizations is limited to net earnings from members, the deduc-
tion for patronage dividends is limited to distributions from net earnings from mem-
bers. See I.R.C. §§ 1382(b), 1388 (Supp. 2004).
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avoid corporate income taxes.' 9 Rather than the income tax exemp-
tion, the more important tax advantage enjoyed by Sec-
tion 501(c)(3) organizations is the right of donors to deduct their
donations from their income for personal income tax purposes.' A
related benefit is that purchasers of bonds issued by such organiza-
tions do not have to pay tax on interest from such bonds.2' Beyond
these federal tax benefits, qualifying nonprofits also enjoy various
state law tax advantages, such as exemption from sales taxes and
property taxes.2 We provide a simplified comparison of the tax
treatment of for-profit and nonprofit firms in Table 1. (In Part III,
we will address some complications.)
Table 1. Tax treatment of charitable activities by corporate form.
Corporate Form
For-Profit Nonprofit
Corporate Commercial No tax benefits No tax benefits
Purpose Charitable No tax benefits Tax benefits
'9 I.R.C. §§ 1361-1379 (2000 & West Supp. 2007). A nonprofit can earn profits but
cannot distribute them. If a for-profit makes profits, it has three options: (1) pay cor-
porate income taxes on the profits and distribute the after-tax profits to owners, who
then have to pay personal income taxes on the distribution; (2) pay corporate income
taxes on the profits and retain the earnings until the next year; or (3) if it is permitted
to choose pass-through treatment, its shareholders would have to pay personal in-
come tax on the profits of the firm, whether the firm distributed profits to its share-
holders or retained the earning. In other words, whereas the nonprofit firm can retain
its profits in a liquid form from year to year, a for-profit cannot do this without either
paying corporate income taxes or personal income taxes. (In the latter case, the
shareholders can make a capital contribution to the firm the next year and that would
serve the same purpose as retained earnings.) Offsetting the advantage that nonprofit
firms can retain earnings without paying any tax is that nonprofit firms cannot distrib-
ute profits to shareholders.
20 See I.R.C. § 170 (2000).
21 See I.R.C § 145. Note, however, that gains from the sale of tax-exempt bonds are
not exempt from capital gains taxation.
22 Qualifying nonprofits also cannot be subject to an involuntary bankruptcy petition
under § 303 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2000); seem to be preferred
when governments contract out functions (consider the relative enthusiasm about
nonprofit charter schools compared to the uneasiness about for-profit schools, see,
e.g., John Morley, Note, For-Profit and Nonprofit Charter Schools: An Agency Costs
Approach, 115 Yale L.J. 1782, 1800-05 (2006)); and enjoy other advantages.
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The motivation for this Essay is that, as a result of coupling, the
for-profit charity enjoys no tax benefits, as highlighted by the
shaded cell in the table. Our argument is that the tax treatment of
the activities in the two bottom cells should be identical.
B. Model of a Nonprofit Charity and a For-Profit Charity Under
Current Law
Let us examine a hypothetical charity to see how operations and
incentives differ depending on its organizational form. Suppose a
donor wants to send money to a beneficiary such as sick children in
Africa. In our hypothetical, a charitable entrepreneur using her or-
ganizational skills and contacts offers to facilitate this transfer. She
forms a nonprofit firm and promises that if the donor gives her
$100, she will ensure $80 reaches the hands of the sick children.
The rest will be used to pay administrative costs. Specifically, she
will take a salary of $10 and use $10 for other expenses.
What would happen if the entrepreneur, instead of taking the
nonprofit form, chooses the for-profit form? First, consider what
would not change. She could continue to adhere to her promise to
send 80% of the donation to sick children. She could spend $10 on
administrative expenses. Whether the entrepreneur chooses a for-
profit form that enjoyed pass-through tax treatment or not, she
could also continue to enjoy a $10 salary because her salary is tax
deductible for the firm. In other words, after she received $100
from the donor, she could run her charity the exact same way she
did before she took the for-profit form.
Now consider what would change if the entrepreneur took the
for-profit form. First, the entrepreneur would have greater incen-
tive to make the charity more efficient by lowering administrative
costs.' Suppose the entrepreneur, by careful planning, could re-
duce expenses other than her salary from $10 to $8. If the charity
were for-profit, she could pocket some of the extra $2 as profit. (If
the for-profit firm qualifies for pass-through tax treatment, then
23 See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 777, 789-90 (1972); H.E. Frech III, The
Property Rights Theory of the Firm: Empirical Results from a Natural Experiment,
84 J. Pol. Econ. 143, 144 (1976) (noting this is a natural consequence of the manager's
attenuated property rights in the firm's profits).
2007] 2027
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she could keep all $2.)24 But if the charity were nonprofit, she
would have to leave the $2 in the firm because the nonprofit form
does not permit distribution of profits. This reduces the entrepre-
neur's incentive to keep expenses down.
Second, the donor would have less incentive to send money to
sick children in Africa through the entrepreneur's for-profit firm. If
the charity entrepreneur took the nonprofit form, the donor could
deduct his donation from his total income when calculating his tax-
able income (assuming the donor itemized his deductions) for per-
sonal income tax purposes. Once the charity becomes for-profit,
the donation is no longer deductible. In other words, while one can
donate to nonprofit charities using pre-tax dollars, one can only
donate to for-profit charities using after-tax dollars. The subsidy
for donation to nonprofits is equivalent to the donor's personal in-
come tax rate. If the tax rate is, for example, 33%, while it would
cost only $100 on a pre-tax basis to give $100 to a nonprofit charity,
it would cost 50% more-$150-on a pre-tax basis to give the same
amount to a for-profit charity.
Table 2. Model of nonprofit and for-profit charities.
(1) (2) (3)
For-profit
Nonprofit For-profit charity (after
charity charity reduction of
admin. expenses)
A) Contribution by donor $100 $150 (33% tax $150 (33% tax
(pre-tax dollars) rate) rate)
B) Money for beneficiary $80 $80 $80
C) Admin. expenses (other $10 $10 $8
than entrepreneur salary)
D) Entrepreneur's salary $10 $10 $10
E) Profits distributed to $0 $0 Up to $2
entrepreneur
This simple model of nonprofit and for-profit charities-
summarized in Table 2-illustrates our basic hypothesis. The donor
must effectively pay more (compare cells 1A and 2A) in order to
24See supra text accompanying note 19.
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have the same charitable effect if the charity is for-profit than if the
charity is nonprofit. This is why there are currently no for-profit
charities (aside from Google). Yet the for-profit charity might be
more efficient-in the sense that its administrative costs are lower
because the entrepreneur has stronger incentives to minimize ad-
ministrative costs (compare cells 1C and 2C to 3C). We will return
to this model in the next Part in order to illustrate how the major
theories that explain the nonprofit form fit into our analysis.
II. A CRITIQUE OF COUPLING
We now arrive at the core of our Essay. In Sections A-E, we cri-
tique the major theories (the public goods theory, the agency the-
ory, the altruism theory, the imperfect consumer theory, and the
administrability theory) that might be offered to explain coupling,"s
and thereby demonstrate that there is no good reason for condi-
tioning tax subsidies for community-benefit activities on nonprofit
status. In Section F, we shall explain the social costs of coupling
and thus complete our affirmative argument for decoupling.
A. The Public Goods Theory
An old but still prominent view is that the government should
subsidize charitable nonprofits because they produce public
goods.26 Consider, for example, a nonprofit that takes donations
25 There are other theories that have been proposed, but we find these five better
reasoned. For example, Professor Boris Bittker and George Rahdert argue that non-
profit firms should be exempt from the corporate income tax because it is difficult to
define the income of nonprofits. Boris 1. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemp-
tion of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 Yale L.J. 299,
307-08 (1976). Their argument rests on the limitation of the § 162 business expense
deduction to profit-motivated activities. Id. at 310. But if that is relaxed, as it surely
would be if for-profit charities were taxed on their income, computing taxable net in-
come would be straightforward. What is more, Bittker and Rahdert assume the only
way to decouple is to eliminate the tax breaks for charitable nonprofits. An alterna-
tive that completely avoids their criticisms is to extend the same tax breaks to charita-
ble for-profit activities.
2 See Burton A. Weisbrod, The Nonprofit Economy 70 (1991); Henry Hansmann,
Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organizations, in The Nonprofit Sector: A Research
Handbook 27, 28-29 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987); Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of
Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 Yale L.J. 835, 848-49 (1980) [hereinafter Hansmann, The
Role of Nonprofit Enterprise]. This is also the theory most closely related to Treasury
Department's post hoc rationale for the nonprofit tax exemptions. See Unrelated
Virginia Law Review
and uses the money to clean up a park. Suppose that local residents
care about the park. In the absence of the nonprofit, people are
unlikely to invest the optimal amount to clean up the park. The
reason is that although every person benefits from a clean park,
one benefits even more if everyone else does the cleaning. If eve-
ryone thinks in the same way and free rides on the clean-up efforts
of others, the aggregate investment will be less than what is opti-
mal.
The standard solution to this problem is government action. The
government taxes everyone and then uses the money to clean up
the park. However, a problem with this type of intervention is that
the government may have difficulty determining the preferences of
citizens. If citizens care about the park a little, the government
should invest little in maintaining it; if citizens care about the park
a lot, the government should invest a lot. But determining and ag-
gregating preferences is difficult, so the government may end up
supplying too little or too much maintenance.
An alternative approach, one that relies on less intrusive gov-
ernment regulation, is tax breaks for donations to charitable non-
profits. The nonprofit takes donations, and because donors receive
a tax benefit, they donate more than they would otherwise. At the
same time, donation remains voluntary, so people will donate only
if they have a relatively strong preference for the collective good
supplied by the nonprofit. Thus, greater donation will occur than in
the absence of the tax subsidy, and the donation will reflect prefer-
ences better than government intervention does. This does not
mean that the free-riding problem is solved. Some people who
benefit from the park will decline to donate even with the tax
break. But the free-riding problem should be reduced.
We take no position on whether this story is correct, although we
will assume that it is correct for purposes of our argument. The
main lesson of the theory is that the government ought to provide
tax breaks for voluntary donations that support the production of
public goods. But the theory says nothing about how the govern-
ment should do this. The theory does not justify giving such tax
Business Income Tax: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm.
on Ways & Means, 100th Cong. 37 (1987) (statement of 0. Donaldson Chapoton,
Deputy Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy), U.S. Department of the Treasury).
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breaks exclusively to nonprofit firms that produce public goods. If
the theory is correct, the tax deduction for charitable contributions
should be made available to any firm-for-profit or nonprofit-
that engages in appropriate activities that benefit third parties. This
is not a novel idea. We frequently observe government giving tax
subsidies to for-profit firms that engage in community-minded ac-
tivities. Consider the massive subsidies, for example, to alternative
energy producers, including automobile manufacturers that de-
velop hybrids and farmers who develop ethanol-based fuel.27 The
recipients are for-profits, so why should similar subsidies not be
made available to for-profit charities?
Similarly, the public goods theory cannot explain why the gov-
ernment should give tax subsidies to donors who contribute to a
nonprofit firm that cleans up parks, but not to donors who contrib-
ute to a for-profit firm that does the same. The public goods theory
justifies tax breaks to firms that clean up parks, and it does not
matter whether the firms are for-profit or nonprofit, or even
whether they take donations or simply charge fees. In sum, the
public goods theory justifies tax breaks but does not justify the
coupling of tax subsidies and the nonprofit form.
B. The Agency Theory
The agency theory holds that the nonprofit form solves an
agency problem-for example, that the entrepreneur (the agent)
who operates a for-profit charity, or her employees, do not act in
the interest of the donors or beneficiaries (the principal).
1. The Model
To understand the argument, consider the three characters in
our hypothetical charity: the entrepreneur, the donor, and the
beneficiary. The donor gives money to the entrepreneur, and the
entrepreneur conveys it to the beneficiary. According to the
agency theory, the entrepreneur cares about two things: her own
27 See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, §§ 1344, 1347, 119 Stat. 594,
1052, 1056 (providing tax incentives to ethanol and bio-diesel producers). The gov-
ernment also provides tax credits to drug companies for clinical research under the
Orphan Drug Act. See 26 U.S.C. § 45C (2000).
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income and benefiting a third party, such as a poor person.' The
literature thus ascribes to the entrepreneur a mix of conventional
selfishness and a kind of directed altruism.29 (Later we will address
the case where the entrepreneur is not altruistic.) The problem is
that the donor cannot verify whether the entrepreneur satisfied her
promise to give 80% of his money to the beneficiary. Technically
speaking, this means the entrepreneur sells a product (transferring
charitable money to a beneficiary) whose quality (getting 80% to
the beneficiary) is nonverifiable, that is, cannot be stipulated in a
contract that is enforceable by a court. We will say that the product
is "high quality" if 80% goes to the beneficiary and "low quality" if
less than 80% goes to the beneficiary.
Clearly the donor is willing to pay more-that is, donate more-
if the charitable service is of high quality than if it is of low quality.
Without loss of generality, we shall assume that the donor is not
willing to pay anything at all for low-quality charitable services.
The entrepreneur can set up her charity as either a for-profit firm
or a nonprofit firm. If she sets up the for-profit firm, she receives
(as sole shareholder) all the profits of the firm-donations minus
both the amount delivered to the beneficiary and the cost of this
delivery. If she sets up the nonprofit firm, she is legally required to
accept a relatively flat salary-it cannot be functionally equivalent
to equity. The law requires the nonprofit firm to retain earnings or
spend it consistently with the firm's purpose. The entrepreneur
may be able to convert some excess income into perquisites such as
a nice office, but she values these perquisites less than the income
itself. The effect of choosing the nonprofit form over the for-profit
2 We use the model of Professors Glaeser and Shleifer. See Edward L. Glaeser &
Andrei Shleifer, Not-for-Profit Entrepreneurs, 81 J. Pub. Econ. 99 (2001). Professor
Hansmann originated the idea that the nonprofit form solves a problem of asymmet-
ric information but did not assume that the entrepreneur was altruistic. See Hans-
mann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 26, at 896-98.
" We will follow the literature in using the term altruism, but clearly the term is not
used synonymously with, say, having a preference to maximize social welfare. See
Anup Malani et al., Theories of Firm Behavior in the Nonprofit Sector: A Synthesis
and Empirical Evaluation, in The Governance of Not-for-Profit Firms 181, 186 n.5
(Edward L. Glaeser ed., 2003) (synthesizing literature on pure and impure altruism).
It means, in this context, that the entrepreneur has a preference for engaging in some
activity (producing good operas, helping a type of poor person, etc.) that is shared by
the consumer; by contrast, the entrepreneur's "selfish" preferences, which higher in-
come allows him to better satisfy, are not shared by the consumer.
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form is that the entrepreneur's payoff from operating the firm is
reduced.
Why, then, would the entrepreneur be willing to choose non-
profit status? The answer is that the donor may be willing to pay
more for charitable services from a firm that has taken the non-
profit form than if it has taken the for-profit form." Indeed, in our
extreme case the donor is willing to pay nothing for charitable ser-
vices provided by the for-profit firm. The reason is that the for-
profit firm cannot commit itself to produce a high-quality product,
that is, deliver 80% of each donation to the beneficiary. Because
the entrepreneur receives revenues minus costs, she has strong in-
centives to produce a low-quality good, that is, convey less than
80%, to reduce costs. For this reason, the donor refuses to buy the
charitable services from the for-profit firm. By contrast, the entre-
preneur's incentives to shirk on quality are blunted if she chooses
nonprofit status. She gains less (ex post) by shirking on quality be-
cause the increased "profit" takes the form of low-value perqui-
sites. At the same time, if she shirks on quality, she loses the altru-
istic benefit of producing a high-quality product. As long as the
entrepreneur is sufficiently altruistic and the nonverifiable compo-
nent of the product's quality is sufficiently high, the entrepreneur
will choose nonprofit status and be able to sell charitable services."
The nonprofit form solves a contracting failure that results from
the fact that courts cannot verify the quality of charitable services.
The nondistribution constraint blunts the incentive of the entre-
"There is an empirical debate about this issue. See infra text accompanying note 40.
3 What makes coupling seem so odd in the context of the agency theory is that the
nondistribution constraint can be thought of or implemented as a confiscatory tax on
the nonprofit firm or the entrepreneur-the opposite of a subsidy for either. The
nondistribution constraint -the key to the agency theory-is currently implemented
by a promise by the entrepreneur not to distribute profits. If she does, she will lose
her nonprofit status and be taxed as a for-profit on the profits. Another way to im-
plement the nondistribution constraint, however, is to tax a firm that takes nonprofit
status not at the for-profit tax rate, but at a 100% tax rate. This will discourage profit-
making even more effectively than does the current implementation of the constraint
because the implicit penalty becomes explicit and greater. A third way to implement
the nondistribution constraint is to raise the personal income tax on the nonprofit en-
trepreneur (or anyone else who controls the assets of the firm). Specifically, the gov-
ernment should tax the entrepreneur's income at a 100% marginal rate above the
level that constitutes a competitive salary. This too would reduce any incentive the
entrepreneur has to make profits.
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preneur to shirk by limiting the return that the entrepreneur re-
ceives from the operation of the firm. The government audits the
firm and punishes it if, in form or in function, the firm issues equity
to the entrepreneur. Suppose, for example, that the entrepreneur
pays herself a flat salary plus an annual bonus equal to the differ-
ence between the firm's revenues and costs in good years, and
takes a pay cut in bad years. Because the entrepreneur has simply
disguised her equity interest, the IRS would penalize her by strip-
ping the firm of its nonprofit status and taxing it on its profits.32
Thus, the nonprofit form solves the contracting problem by substi-
tuting a verifiable proxy (the firm's receipt of donations and pay-
ment of expenses) for the nonverifiable factor (the quality of its
product). The proxy is accurate-in the sense that the firm's bal-
ance sheet is reliably correlated with quality-because the entre-
preneur is partially altruistic and thus can be expected to behave
more altruistically (thus enhancing quality in the interest of the
consumer) if and only if the sensitivity of income to cost-cutting is
reduced.
2. The Problem of the Nonaltruistic Entrepreneur
One problem with the agency theory is that it assumes that only
altruistic entrepreneurs will choose the nonprofit form, and that
nonaltruistic entrepreneurs will always choose the for-profit form.
But this is not necessarily true. A nonaltruistic entrepreneur will
choose the nonprofit form if the benefit from tax breaks notwith-
standing the nondistribution constraint exceeds the benefit from
being able freely to draw profits as income. What are the benefits
of tax breaks in light of the nondistribution constraint? Even ignor-
ing perquisites, recall that the nondistribution constraint does not
prevent the nonaltruistic entrepreneur from receiving a competi-
tive wage. Tax breaks increase the value of this benefit to the ex-
tent that they provide a financial cushion that ensures the gross
earnings of the nonprofit always cover the cost of the entrepre-
neur's wage. This reduces her risk of job loss. This cushion also
permits the entrepreneur to devote less effort to organization
32The IRS now may impose intermediate sanctions by assessing fines and penalties
for excessive compensation transactions. See I.R.C. § 4958 (West Supp. 2007).
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without sacrificing her wage. In other words, tax breaks can subsi-
dize the entrepreneur's consumption of leisure.
If a nonaltruistic entrepreneur forms a nonprofit firm, the non-
distribution constraint cannot guarantee the entrepreneur will not
shirk on product quality. She may not do it to increase her cash in-
come, but she can shirk on quality to reduce the risk of job loss or
to increase her leisure.33 This problem can be evaded if donors can
distinguish altruists and nonaltruists. But there is no reason to
think that donors are any better at distinguishing altruists from
nonaltruists than at distinguishing high-quality from low-quality
charitable services. Therefore, the possibility that a nonprofit char-
ity is operated by a nonaltruist will reduce the willingness of donors
to patronize it. This in turn weakens the attractiveness of the
agency theory as a justification for special treatment of nonprofits.
3. Substitutes for the Nondistribution Constraint
Another problem with the agency theory is that it implicitly-
and incorrectly-assumes that the nondistribution constraint can-
not be established by contract. If this assumption is wrong, for-
profit firms can solve the noncontractible quality problem as well
as the nonprofit firm can. Specifically, the for-profit can promise
donors, by contract, that it will not distribute profits to its manag-
ers or workers.' Unlike quality, profits are verifiable; so this is an
" This is just a specific case of a more general problem. The contract failure theory
is a version of the multitask principal-agent problem. The principal-the donor-
would like the agent-the charity entrepreneur-to engage in two tasks: produce a
high-quality product and keep down costs. The problem is that these tasks reflect a
tradeoff, that is, one way to lower costs is to produce a low-quality product, and the
principal cannot verify quality. The principal can encourage the agent to engage in
cost reduction, for example by letting the agent keep the profits of the endeavor. But
a lesson of the multitask literature is that if the principal encourages one task but not
the other, the agent will only engage in the first task. It is not a complete solution to
eliminate the incentive on all tasks, because then the agent will do no work. In the
nonprofit context, eliminating the incentive to cut costs may result in less work rather
than enhanced quality.
"This idea is related to Professor Jensen's "free cash flow theory" for why share-
holders may prefer the issuance of debt. Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free
Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 Am. Econ. Rev. 323 (1986). In
firms with a lot of uncommitted or free cash flows, there is a risk that managers will
use these cash flows to make investments that are not in the interests of shareholders.
Therefore, shareholders may prefer that the firm convert equity to debt because ser-
vicing debt will consume free cash flows. Equity does not do the same because issu-
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enforceable contract. And it achieves the same incentives as the
nonprofit form.
What exactly would such a contract look like? There are two
possibilities. First, the entrepreneur could start a for-profit firm
rather than a nonprofit firm, but hire a manager to run the firm.
The entrepreneur would promise donors that the manager would
control the firm; that the manager would be paid a fixed wage; that
the manager would be prohibited from owning any shares in the
firm; and that the entrepreneur would limit the perquisites that the
manager could extract from the firm. These promises, along with
the firm's product, would be part of the sales contract for that
product. The entrepreneur could also hire an auditor such as
PricewaterhouseCoopers to police the contract. The auditor would
be the private analogue to the state attorney general or the IRS in
the nonprofit setting. The entrepreneur-and other investors-
would be able to keep the firm's profits after production costs and
paying the manager. If the entrepreneur instead funneled profits or
provided additional perquisites to the manager, the auditor would
blow the whistle, and the donors could sue the entrepreneur for
breach of contract.
Another approach would be for the entrepreneur to run the firm
herself but offer a cost-plus pricing scheme.35 In this scheme, the
donor would pay a final price that reflects costs, plus the entrepre-
neur's opportunity cost of time. This could be implemented by bill-
ing the donor after all costs have been tallied and the product has
been delivered. Alternatively, the firm could refund to the donors
any profits it makes during the year. Either way, the firm would be
the functional equivalent of a purchaser-cooperative with the en-
ance of dividends is optional for managers. The debt in Jensen's theory serves to limit
managers' discretion by limiting their resources. The nondistribution contract clause
we propose also serves to limit managers' discretion. But the beneficiary is not the
shareholder, which in our model is the same as the manager. Rather, the beneficiary is
the consumer or donor, who is ensured that the manager will not shirk on quality to
raise profits. Moreover, whereas debt limits the resources available to managers to
engage in moral hazard, the nondistribution clause curbs the incentives of managers
to engage in moral hazard.
"The cost-plus contract is familiar from the construction industry. Although many
people criticize the cost-plus contract in the construction industry because it does not
give contractors an incentive to minimize expenses, it should, by the same token,
work admirably when the entrepreneur is a partial altruist who also cares about in-
come-our assumptions.
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trepreneur taking the role of the manager. The donors, rather than
the entrepreneur, would serve as residual claimants. If the entre-
preneur instead pocketed the profits, the donors would be able to
sue her for breach of contract. Indeed, Professor Henry Hans-
mann, one of the originators of the agency theory, makes this
point-that the cooperative form solves agency problems between
the entrepreneur and the purchaser.36 Our observation is simply
that the cooperative form is one of several private contract substi-
tutes for the nondistribution constraint.
The key to both the fixed wage and cost-plus contracts is that the
person in control of the firm-whether a manager hired by the en-
trepreneur or the entrepreneur herself-receives a flat wage. This
eliminates the incentives to cut costs in a manner that sacrifices
quality. So long as the person in control of the firm is altruistic, he
or she will substitute higher quality for profits. (Note that where
the entrepreneur delegates control to a manager, it is the manager
and not the entrepreneur who must be altruistic.)
A possible objection to the contractual implementation of non-
profit incentives is that they do not take advantage of the govern-
ment's power to audit. As we saw before, the nonprofit is moni-
tored by state attorneys general and the IRS, which penalizes the
nonprofit if it produces profits for its stakeholders. By contrast, our
contractual implementation would require donors to detect
breaches themselves or rely on private auditors to blow the whistle,
and then the donors would have to take the trouble of filing a law-
suit.
But this objection misses the mark. Monitoring by attorneys
general and regulatory agencies is expensive, and monitoring by
donors and private auditors is expensive. There is no reason to
think that the former is cheaper than the latter.37 Indeed, the evi-
36 Henry Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise 150, 159, 190, 197-99 (1996). An
interesting possibility is that a for-profit firm with a cost-plus contract can reorganize
as a cooperative or perhaps mutual. As we explained, supra note 18, this yields a par-
tial exemption from corporate income tax. It does not, however, replicate the federal
charitable tax deduction or the state property and sales tax exemption. Thus, choosing
the cooperative or mutual form is no better than choosing a pass-through entity such
as an S corporation or a partnership.
. Indeed, many statutes authorize private citizens-self-appointed "private attor-
ney[s] general," Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per
curiam)-to enforce laws intended to promote public policies rather than the interests
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dence suggests that state attorneys general rarely prosecute trus-
tees of nonprofit firms for violations of their fiduciary duties and
the IRS almost never revokes a firm's nonprofit status.38 The IRS
rarely even imposes intermediate sanctions on nonprofit firms who
violate the nondistribution constraint.39 It may well be that private
auditing and litigation would be superior to the current system, or
that some mixed system-in which government auditing supple-
ments private litigation-would be optimal.
In a world without tax preferences for nonprofit firms, some en-
trepreneurs would choose the nonprofit form and others would
choose the for-profit form; among the latter, some would offer to
forgo profits by contract and others would not. Donors would
sometimes deal with the first type of entrepreneur and sometimes
deal with the second or third type. The agency theory can explain
why an entrepreneur would choose the nonprofit-to implement a
no-profit pledge by means of the nondistribution constraint. It
cannot explain, however, why this entrepreneur also needs a tax
break. Just as important is that the agency theory cannot explain
why such a tax break, even if justified, should not also be extended
to for-profit firms that take a no-profit pledge.
Moreover, there is mixed evidence that purchasers in markets
with nonprofit firms place value on the noncontractible quality that
the nondistribution constraint protects.' Interestingly, the markets
of the private citizens. See, e.g., Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,
Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.) (authorizing private securities fraud actions); False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(b) (2000) (authorizing private qui tam fraud actions); Toxic Substances Con-
trol Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (2000) (allowing private citizen suits against violators).
m John F. Coverdale, Preventing Insider Misappropriation of Not-for-Profit Health
Care Provider Assets: A Federal Tax Law Prescription, 73 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 10 (1998)
(arguing "the IRS viewed revocation as an extreme penalty, to be invoked only in
egregious cases").
See I.R.C. § 4958. Although intermediate sanctions were adopted in 1996, see
Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. 104-168, § 1311, 110 Stat. 1452, 1475-79 (1996), the
IRS did not win its first case until 2002, Caracci v. Comm'r, 118 T.C. 379, 413-16
(2002), and promptly lost that case on appeal, 456 F.3d 444, 462 (5th Cir. 2006).
'Compare Tomas Philipson, Asymmetric Information and the Not-for-Profit Sec-
tor: Does Its Output Sell at a Premium?, in The Changing Hospital Industry: Compar-
ing Not-for-Profit and For-Profit Institutions 325 (David M. Cutler ed., 2000) (using
data from the nursing home industry and finding no statistically significant difference
between the prices of nonprofit and for-profit homes, suggesting that the nonprofit
form provides no advantage with respect to noncontractible quality), and Anup Ma-
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that are studied-hospitals, nursing homes, and childcare-have a
significant for-profit presence. This is possible because these mar-
kets do not depend on donations, and therefore for-profit firms are
not handicapped by at least one of the tax breaks for nonprofit
firms-the exclusive tax deduction for donations to nonprofit
firms. But the for-profit presence indicates that for-profit firms can
survive even if nonverifiable quality has value, probably because
they provide verifiable quality in an efficient manner. Surely that
would also be true in the charity market. In other words, some do-
nors may choose nonprofit charities because of their noncontrac-
tible quality, but others may choose for-profit charities because
they are more efficient. This is yet another reason to avoid tax dis-
crimination against for-profit firms.
4. Irrelevance of Tax Breaks
There is another theory-which we shall call the capital access
theory-that attempts to justify tax breaks and that can perhaps be
combined with the agency theory to justify coupling these breaks
with the nondistribution constraints. According to the capital ac-
cess theory, firms that comply with the nondistribution constraint
face limits raising capital from equity markets because they cannot
distribute profits to owners. In order to compete fairly with for-
profit firms, which do not face this constraint, they must be given
assistance raising money from sources other than capital markets."'
lani & Guy David, Does Nonprofit Status Signal Quality?, 37 J. Legal Stud. (forth-
coming Mar. 2008) (finding that most nonprofit firms do not bother to mention their
nonprofit status in their marketing, which suggests that nonprofit status may not be a
signal of noncontractible quality), with Shin-Yi Chou, Asymmetric Information,
Ownership and Quality of Care: An Empirical Analysis of Nursing Homes, 21 J.
Health Econ. 293, 294 (2002) (finding nonprofit nursing homes provide better care
than for-profit nursing homes "when the service is not monitored"), and Maria D.
Fitzpatrick, Can Prices Tell Us Anything About Whether a Firm's Status Is a Signal
to Consumers? (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review
Association) (replicating Philipson's study and finding a nonprofit price advantage in
one of two markets studied).
41 See Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations
from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 Yale L.J. 54, 72-75 (1981); see also Timothy J.
Goodspeed & Daphne A. Kenyon, The Nonprofit Sector's Capital Constraint: Does
It Provide a Rationale for the Tax Exemption Granted to Nonprofit Firms?, 21 Pub.
Fin. Q. 415 (1993). Professors Goodspeed and Kenyon focus their argument on the
corporate income tax exemption, but it can be generalized to all other exemptions. To
be fair to Goodspeed and Kenyon, they do not argue for a nonprofit income tax break
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What are these sources? Donations, bond issuances, loans, and re-
tained earnings. Therefore, donations should be facilitated by a tax
deduction for donations to a nonprofit. Bond issuances should be
facilitated by allowing bond-holders to deduct interest payments
from income. Loans should also be supported this way, but the law
takes a more limited step, preventing creditors, including lenders,
from pushing the nonprofit involuntarily into bankruptcy.42 Finally,
retained earnings should be bolstered by ensuring that they will not
be taxed away. This implies exemptions from corporate income,
property, and sales taxes.
The main problem with the capital access theory is that its as-
sumption that the nondistribution constraint limits access to capital
is questionable. For one thing, capital is fungible and mobile. Even
if a nonprofit firm cannot legally tap equity markets for capital, it
can tap debt markets at rates competitive with equity markets. And
in any case, few nonprofits are large enough that it is economical
for them to raise capital on equity markets.43
Another problem with the capital access theory is that there is a
poor fit between the scope of the nondistribution constraint under
the agency theory and the scope of the constraint under both exist-
ing law and the capital access theory. The purpose of the nondis-
tribution constraint in the agency theory is to prevent the distribu-
tion of profits to any person who exercises control over a nonprofit
firm. If such a person were to benefit from greater profit, she might
shirk on quality to cut costs and thus increase profits. Nothing in
the agency theory requires that persons who do not control the
firm be barred from distributions of profit. Therefore, the agency
theory is compatible with issuance of a class of shares that give
rights to the firm's residual earnings but have no voting or other
control rights. Only when this is not feasible, such as when the firm
needs both the entrepreneur's capital and her managerial talent,
does the nondistribution constraint limit access to capital. Surely
simply to level the playing field, but to promote efficiency. One efficiency benefit of
the tax is to prevent bias against use of capital in the nonprofit sector. A second effi-
ciency benefit is that if nonprofit output is a public good, a tax exemption might in-
crease nonprofit output. We addressed the latter point in our discussion of the public
good theory for nonprofits, supra Section II.A.
42 See discussion supra note 22.
3 See Goodspeed & Kenyon, supra note 41, at 422 (noting that equity accounts for
no more than nine percent of capital raised by for-profit corporations).
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this is the rare case. Existing law, however, goes beyond the scope
of the agency theory, barring the issuance of even nonvoting shares
when they are feasible. Only because the actual nondistribution
constraint exceeds the scope justified by the agency theory is the
capital access theory required to justify some of the tax breaks for
nonprofits.
Somewhat consistent with this view, the British government has
adopted an alternative strategy to ease access to capital for non-
profit firms: simply relax the nondistribution constraint a bit. Spe-
cifically, the Community Interest Company ("CIC") law estab-
lishes a new corporate form that allows a firm engaging in
charitable activities (and indeed any firm that the government
deems is operating for the "benefit of the community") to issue
stock and grant dividends," but the implementing regulations cap
those dividends at thirty-five percent of total profits.45 Moreover,
the charitable CIC is not permitted to sell its assets to a for-profit
firm unless the firm receives full consideration.46 Importantly, the
charitable CIC does not receive the tax breaks that traditional Brit-
ish charities receive, that is, the equivalent of the tax breaks for
nonprofit firms in the United States. In short, the CIC form allows
community-benefit firms to raise limited capital from equity mar-
kets but discourages profit-driven shirking by limiting the extent of
dividends.
A final problem with the capital access theory is that it supports
tax breaks not only for nonprofit firms, but also for certain for-
profit firms that take a no-profit pledge. Consider, for example, an
entrepreneur who starts a firm, acts as manager, and offers donors
a cost-plus contract. Suppose this firm requires start-up or expan-
sion capital that exceeds the revenue that future donors who will
benefit from this investment are willing to pay today. This firm
may not be able to access capital markets because it cannot prom-
ise equity investors sufficient control rights. The capital access the-
ory also supports extending the tax breaks for alternative capital
access to this for-profit firm.
'Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act, 2004, c. 26
(U.K.).
"Community Interest Company Regulations, 2005, S.I. 2005/1788, art. 22, $ 1
(U.K.).
'This is called an "asset lock."
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C. The Altruism Theory
A third theory that might justify coupling relies on the nondis-
tribution constraint selectively attracting charity entrepreneurs
who are altruistic to the nonprofit form. Because altruists have a
preference for producing public goods, tax breaks to promote pub-
lic goods have a higher return when they are given to altruists.
Given the sorting of altruists into nonprofit firms, the theory sup-
ports the targeting of tax breaks at nonprofit firms, that is, coupling
tax breaks and the nonprofit form.
Before criticizing this theory, we should say something about its
provenance. Economists who have analyzed this theory do not ad-
vocate it as a justification for coupling; they are more interested in
positive questions such as whether nonprofit and for-profit firms
behave differently. 7 But the positive theory has surface appeal as a
normative theory. So in this Section, we convert the positive theory
to a normative theory and then criticize the normative theory.
1. Altruism Without Tax Breaks
Suppose there are two types of entrepreneurs: those who care
only about their income (nonaltruists), and those who also care
about the quality or quantity of products they produce (altruists). 4'
In the charity context, for example, the altruist would care not just
about her income, but also about how many beneficiaries her char-
ity served or how well it served those beneficiaries. In the discus-
sion below we shall conceptualize this preference as a desire for
47 See, e.g., Darius Lakdawalla & Tomas Philipson, The Nonprofit Sector and Indus-
try Performance, 90 J. Pub. Econ. 1681 (2006); Joseph P. Newhouse, Toward a Theory
of Nonprofit Institutions: An Economic Model of a Hospital, 60 Am. Econ. Rev. 64
(1970) (considering the effect of a private hospital's nonprofit status on its economic
efficiency).
41 Standard models of the altruism theory assume an imperfect altruism where the
entrepreneur has preferences not directly for the welfare or consumption of benefici-
aries, but for the entrepreneur's production of goods that beneficiaries might con-
sume. See Lakdawalla & Philipson, supra note 47; Malani et al., supra note 29;
Newhouse, supra note 47. This is usually modeled as entrepreneurs having prefer-
ences for the quantity or quality of production. An exception is A.G. Holtmann, A
Theory of Non-Profit Firms, 50 Economica 439 (1983).
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warm-glow consumption from doing good.' 9 In contrast to our as-
sumptions above for the agency theory, here we assume that qual-
ity (like quantity) is verifiable and that the entrepreneur cannot
take income home as a perquisite. Since it makes no difference to
our discussion whether the altruist cares about quality or quantity,
to keep things simple we shall proceed assuming the entrepreneur
cares mainly about quantity.
Each entrepreneur has to decide whether to form a nonprofit or
for-profit firm. If an entrepreneur forms a nonprofit firm, she will
receive only a fixed income. If her cost structure is such that she
can make profits (revenues minus costs, including her salary) even
at the competitive price for her output, she will not be able to take
that profit home as income. She can, however, spend her profit on
producing more output. If an entrepreneur forms a for-profit firm,
she not only receives a salary, but can also take home any profit
the firm makes.
Obviously, if an entrepreneur is nonaltruistic, then she will be at-
tracted to the for-profit form. However, if the entrepreneur also
cares about product quantity, the choice is a bit more subtle. The
for-profit form is flexible. So if an entrepreneur cares just a little
about quantity, the for-profit form will allow her to sacrifice a little
profit to produce a little more quantity than the nonaltruist. If an
entrepreneur cares a lot about quantity and is willing to sacrifice all
her profits to produce more quantity, then she will be indifferent
between the for-profit form and the nonprofit form. Both forms
will allow her to covert all her profits into higher quantity output.
The nonprofit form just makes it a requirement, though for a
highly motivated entrepreneur, this requirement is not binding.
" For a discussion of imperfect altruism and warm-glow giving, see James Andreoni,
Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving,
100 Econ. J. 464 (1990).
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Figure 1. Effect of tax break on quality and costs.
qn qf2 qf3 qnt
An altruistic entrepreneur's choice is illustrated in Figure 1,
which uses solid lines to indicate the marginal cost (MC) and aver-
age cost (AC) curves of a given entrepreneur without tax breaks. °
The x-axis gives quantity, the y-axis price. The average cost and
marginal curves are U-shaped on the uncontroversial assumptions
that an entrepreneur has some fixed costs and experiences dimin-
ishing returns to scale. If an entrepreneur were nonaltruistic and
only cared about income, she would choose the for-profit form and
50We assume technology is linked to the entrepreneur, which is why she is the en-
trepreneur rather than simply an investor or creditor.
These are standard assumptions in the neoclassical model of the firm, even in the
case of quality rather quantity output. See, e.g., Newhouse, supra note 47, at 68 fig.1.
2044 [Vol. 93:2017
The Case for For-Profit Charities
produce quantity qf, given by the intersection of the marginal cost
curve and the market price line p,,. (Price, in this context, refers to
how much a donor is willing to pay to help the beneficiary of the
charity.) This would maximize her profit, which is the average per-
unit profit of p,, minus average cost at q. times quantity produced
qf,, or equivalently the area of the rectangle ABCD.
A moderately altruistic entrepreneur would also choose a for-
profit firm, but produce at some quantity q,, to the right of qq. Be-
cause the marginal cost of each unit of production to the right of qf,
is greater than the price p. donors are willing to pay on behalf of
the beneficiaries, the moderate altruist is paying out of pocket the
triangle DEF to get the additional warm-glow consumption value
of q,, - qf," A highly altruistic entrepreneur, in contrast, may be
willing to sacrifice a lot more income to obtain additional warm-
glow consumption value. If the marginal utility of that consump-
tion is at least as great as the marginal cost at q,, her break-even
point, then she is willing to sacrifice all her income for additional
warm glow. Such an entrepreneur would be indifferent between
forming a for-profit firm and voluntarily sacrificing all her profits
and forming a nonprofit firm that bars her from taking profits.
It is important to note that, whatever the entrepreneur's choice,
it is always efficient. Although a highly altruistic entrepreneur's
production at q, entails wasteful production to the extent of the
triangle DGH, because that choice was voluntary and the cost is
completely borne by the entrepreneur, it must be that the warm-
glow value of additional production q, - qf, is greater than the tri-
angle DGH.
2. Altruism with Nonprofit Tax Breaks
Now assume a tax break for nonprofit firms. The immediate ef-
fect is always to lower the cost curves of an entrepreneur choosing
the nonprofit form. But the welfare effect of such a tax break de-
pends on whether the output being produced is a public good. If it
is not a public good, we shall demonstrate that the tax break gen-
erates inefficient production. If it is a public good, one can use the
altruism theory to generate a normative argument in favor of non-
profit tax breaks. We shall argue, however, that even when dealing
with public goods, the case for subsidizing nonprofits alone is
weak. The reason is that the subsidy can crowd out for-profits that
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produce the charitable good more cheaply than the nonprofits,
even given the cost-absorptive effects of the warm glow.
Consider, first, the case where output is not a public good. As we
mentioned, the tax break has the immediate effect of lowering the
cost curves of altruists who choose the nonprofit form. Since the
nonprofit firm does not permit the entrepreneur to distribute prof-
its, she must produce output at the break-even point, that is, where
price equals average cost. Therefore, we can illustrate the effect of
a nonprofit tax break in Figure 1 by examining just its effect on the
average cost curve of a nonprofit entrepreneur. The nonprofit tax
break shifts her curve down to AC, This in turn expands the
choices available to an altruist. She can chose the for-profit form,
produce at any point between q. and q,, and perhaps earn some
profits. Or she can choose the nonprofit form and produce at q,
Depending on how much value different altruists draw from warm-
glow consumption, altruists who previously chose the for-profit
form and produced more than qfl but less than q, before might
convert to nonprofit status so that they can produce at q,. On the
one hand, they lose some profit. On the other hand they get a big
boost-from q. to q,,-in warm-glow consumption because of the
tax break. If the warm-glow value of this increment is large
enough, an altruist will switch from for-profit to nonprofit form.
Unlike the case without tax breaks, however, these "switches"
are inefficient. By inefficient we mean that the excess cost of addi-
tional production at q., is not worth the warm-glow consumption it
is generating. We say "excess" cost of this production because the
marginal cost of production at q,, is greater than the price donors
are willing to pay for that production. The total excess cost is the
triangle AIJ. The exact value of the warm-glow consumption is un-
known. But we know it is less than the excess cost so long as the al-
truists' utility is consistent with standard economic assumptions.
Because the marginal cost of production is not decreasing, if the
warm-glow consumption value at q,, were greater than its excess
cost, then it must also be true that the warm-glow consumption
value at q, is greater than its excess cost AGH. But that is clearly
not true for altruists who, in the absence of the tax break, would
have chosen to produce any quantity less than q.. In other words,
an altruist who switches from producing less than break-even out-
put before a tax break to nonprofit status after the tax break does
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not experience enough additional warm-glow consumption to jus-
tify the additional cost of that consumption."52
3. With Public Goods
What if the output being produced is a public good? Then the
additional production of quantity by the nonprofit altruist may be
efficient. One way to state this is that the tax break modifies an al-
truistic entrepreneur's costs so that they are more in line with the
social value of a good. Another way to state it is that the price that
donors pay for additional quantity plus the warm-glow consump-
tion value from the additional quantity do not capture the full pub-
lic good value of that output. Once that public good value is ac-
counted for, the additional quantity would be worth the costs.
While this argument may justify offering a tax break to nonprof-
its, it cannot be used to justify coupling because the same argument
also justifies offering tax breaks to for-profits that produce a public
good. Consider a nonaltruist who runs a for-profit firm that main-
tains a park with fees it charges visitors and donations by local
residents. Because of the collective action problem among local
residents, there are insufficient donations to maintain the park at
the pristine level that residents would prefer. The firm will "under-
produce" the park relative to what it would produce if, for in-
stance, it could tax local residents to cover the costs of a better
park. The government can solve this problem by providing tax sub-
sidies to the firm on the logic that a nicer park would benefit local
residents and be cost justified. These subsidies would encourage
more donations and make existing fees and donations go further in
promoting the park. Importantly, the fact that the manager of the
park-maintenance firm is nonaltruistic does not undermine the
logic of this argument for for-profit tax benefits.
So how might the altruism theory justify coupling if tax breaks
for public goods are efficient when given to either nonprofits or
5 As for altruists who were producing at the break-even point before the tax break,
they may or may not value the additional consumption after the tax break more than
the additional cost of that consumption. If these altruists were independently wealthy
and would have used that wealth to consume some output q. to the right of q.,, then
the tax break would be net beneficial. If even independently wealthy altruists would
have consumed less than q.,, then the incremental consumption from q. to q., would
be inefficient.
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for-profits? The answer relies partly on the observation that, be-
cause nonprofits attract altruists and altruists obtain additional
warm-glow value from producing public goods, tax breaks targeted
at nonprofits go further than those targeted at for-profits. It also
relies on the assumption that the government may have a limited
budget for tax breaks. To understand the argument, compare two
entrepreneurs who have identical production technology, that is,
who can produce identical products at identical cost. Assume that
one entrepreneur is altruistic and chooses nonprofit status, and the
other is nonaltruistic and chooses for-profit status. Whereas the
for-profit nonaltruist will spend a part of each dollar tax break on
the costs of additional production and convert the rest into profits,
the nonprofit altruist will spend the whole dollar on additional
production. It is true that decoupling would give both the for-profit
and the nonprofit a tax break. Moreover, some altruists would
choose the for-profit form under decoupling, and these for-profit
altruists would take home less profit per dollar of tax break than
nonaltruists. But if we assume the government has a limited budget
to support the production of additional quantity, because the re-
turn to subsidizing nonprofit production will be greater than the re-
turn to subsidizing for-profit production, the government should
target tax breaks at nonprofits.
The main weakness of a strictly nonprofit tax break is that dif-
ferent entrepreneurs may not have identical production technol-
ogy. Some may be more efficient than others and therefore have
lower cost functions than others. Moreover, there may not be that
many altruistic producers in the market. We can make the point
with a simple example. Suppose that donors would like to subsidize
soup kitchens. There are many altruistic entrepreneurs who can
run soup kitchens, but not enough to feed all of the poor. Although
many of the altruists might be quite efficient at keeping down
costs, others might be less capable. They care about the poor but
they do not know much about buying food in bulk, storing it prop-
erly, and finding cheap but convenient locations. Although their al-
truism will cause them to work hard, their cost is likely to be higher
than that of nonaltruists who are more skilled at controlling costs.
At some point, aggregate demand for the soup kitchen will reach
such a level that donors exhaust the capacity of efficient altruists.
But because of coupling, donors will donate to an altruist who runs
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a high-cost nonprofit soup kitchen rather than a nonaltruist who
runs a lower cost for-profit that is willing to provide food to poor
people for free in return for donations from donors.
The technical way of putting this point is that, even assuming
that there is no correlation between altruism and cost of produc-
tion and that all altruists choose the nonprofit form, it is possible
that at higher levels of output, because the number of altruists is
limited, the aggregate supply curve of subsidized nonprofit altruists
rises above the aggregate supply curve of subsidized nonaltruists.
This implies that at higher levels of aggregate demand a nonprofit
tax break may be a more costly method of generating additional
output than a universal tax break.
We can summarize our discussion of the altruism theory as fol-
lows. If output is a public good, the goal of the government is to
promote production. For any given level of output, the government
ought to enable donors to purchase from the least-cost suppliers.
To do otherwise would be to transfer surplus from donors to pro-
ducers. Even in the case of altruistic producers, that is not a stated
goal of the government. Moreover, coupling may entail what
economists call deadweight loss because, on the margin, there may
be donors who value quantity greater than the social cost of its
production, but who do not purchase it because the marginal for-
profit producer's private costs are higher than the true social cost
of that production.
To elaborate on the least-cost supplier point, although the altru-
ism theory may justify a tax break to a nonprofit producer when
costs are held constant, it does not unambiguously justify denying
tax breaks to for-profits in the more realistic case that costs are not
constant. In the latter case, the relevant considerations are the dis-
tribution of costs among altruists and nonaltruists, the relative
prevalence of altruists and nonaltruists, and the level of aggregate
demand given decoupling. A negative correlation between costs
and altruism, a relative abundance of altruists, and a small aggre-
gate demand all lessen the likelihood that harm would result from
coupling. But we neither believe that these assumptions are correct
nor that they can be verified. We see no reason why altruists would
have better technology and thus lower costs than for-profits. Al-
though altruists get warm-glow value from lower costs, nonaltruists
get direct income from lower costs. Nor do we know how it could
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be verified that there are sufficient altruists that their competitive
advantage from average cost pricing would not be outstripped by
aggregate demand.
D. A Theory of Imperfect Consumers
Each of the previous theories assumed that the donor is a well-
informed and rational individual. Under the public goods theory,
she provides the government with good information on the public
goods she values. Under the agency theory, she rationally chooses
to donate to a firm complying with the nondistribution constraint
because that constraint protects her from shirking. And under the
altruism theory, the donor smartly plays along when the govern-
ment seeks to allocate funding to altruists on the theory that they
are lower priced producers of public goods.
Yet donors may make mistakes. This could be a product of limi-
tations on the cognitive ability or capacity of donors. Or it may be
the result of deception by charities. When this happens, one may
be able to justify the nondistribution constraint as a consumer pro-
tection device.
Suppose donors are prone to choosing poorly and are thus in-
sensitive to administrative costs when selecting among charities.
Since administrative costs, broadly defined, include distributions,
this implies that, all other things being equal, charities which may
distribute profits have higher administrative costs than charities
which may not. Yet imperfect donors may still patronize charities
which may distribute profits. The result is that donors do not get
the most public good bang for their buck.
The same problem arises when consumers care about adminis-
trative costs but can be deceived by charities. In this case, charities
that are allowed to distribute profits may have greater incentive to
deceive donors than charities that are not so allowed. This view
sounds like the agency theory, but a critical distinction is that the
consumer in the agency theory would be savvy enough to select the
firm that complies with the nondistribution constraint. Under the
theory of imperfect consumers, the donor cannot protect herself
from deception by seeking out safe organizational forms. It is for
this reason that the government might restrict her choices.
So far, however, the theory is just another justification for the
nondistribution constraint. To understand coupling, we need to
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consider the government's tax break for nonprofits. Because the
tax break is keyed to the donor's personal allocation to charities, it
effectively delegates power over government expenditure to the
donor. For the same reason that the donor is a poor decisionmaker
for her own allocations, she is a poor agent to control the govern-
ment's expenditures. This is why the tax breaks must be restricted
to firms that cannot distribute profits. It is a way to protect the
government from imperfect donors.
We are not persuaded by this argument. For one thing, there are
numerous federal and state laws to protect consumers against
fraud. We see no need to supplement these with restrictions on the
ability of charities to distribute profits. Indeed, unless one felt that
donors are more susceptible to fraud by charities than consumers
are to fraud by the ordinary firm, such as an automobile repair
shop or a drug manufacturer, one would not limit the nondistribu-
tion constraint to charities but extend it to all firms. But the idea of
requiring all firms to cease distributing profits is out of the ques-
tion. It would be hard to imagine how a market economy would
operate with such a limit.
Even if there were reasons to be uniquely concerned about de-
ception by charities or if one were concerned not about deception,
which is the grist for consumer protection laws, but about donors'
indifference to administrative costs, there is a simpler solution. The
government should not delegate the allocation of its expenditures
to donors. This does not imply that it ought not fund charities, but
that it should not construct the tax break to "match" donors' con-
tributions. For example, it should not make donations a deductible
expense for donors, a direct form of matching private dollars with
public dollars. And perhaps it should give tax credits for charitable
expenditures (other than fundraising) rather than give a tax ex-
emption from corporate income taxes because the latter indirectly
rewards fundraising while the former does not. Even more simply,
the government can purchase public goods through ordinary pro-
cedures for government procurement, which include competitive
bidding. This proposal is consistent with decoupling. The govern-
ment would no longer need to require that charities comply with
the nondistribution constraint to obtain tax benefits, which would
be untethered from donations, or to bid on government contracts
for production of public goods.
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An objection based on the public goods theory might be that the
government does not know which public goods the public values.
Therefore, it must delegate expenditures to donors because dona-
tions give signals about the public's need. But the idea that donors
have private information about what the public needs is in some
tension with the idea that they are insensitive to administrative
costs. Do donors care or do they not? Even if one were to accept
this tension, there is a reform that is both better and simpler than
the coupling of the nondistribution constraint with tax benefits.
That reform would ask people to select, say, on their income tax
form, an activity-rather than the organization-they would like to
fund and a dollar amount they would like to fund that activity.
Then the government would accumulate these dollars and choose
an organization to receive such dollars. (Individuals would remain
free to donate directly to an organization, but they would only re-
ceive a tax deduction for donations to activities, not to organiza-
tions.) This procedure would elicit private information about val-
ues of public goods, without coupling them to ill-chosen
organizations.
E. Administration of Section 501 (c) (3)
A final theory that may justify coupling focuses on the problem
of policing the boundary between Section 501(c)(3) and other ac-
tivities. Section 501(c)(3) broadly identifies the types of organiza-
tions, such as those operating for "charitable purposes," that are
eligible for certain tax breaks (if they also comply with the nondis-
tribution constraint). The provision delegates to the IRS and the
courts the task of fleshing out what specific activities have charita-
ble purposes. This is a challenging task because the IRS has given
the term charitable an interpretation that is broader than simply
funneling money from a donor to a poor or sick person. It may in-
clude providing job placement services for the beneficiary, or it
may involve selling healthcare to the beneficiary, and perhaps even
the donor, at a discounted price. This expansion, which may be jus-
tified by the objective of broadly supporting the production of pub-
lic goods, has increased pressure on the IRS to decide which spe-
cific activities have charitable purposes. It is already plagued with
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questions about why pharmacies or fitness centers do not qualify
though hospitals do. 3
One thing that arguably makes the problem manageable is that
there are limited private returns to qualifying for Section 501(c)(3)
tax breaks because these breaks only extend to firms that eschew
the distribution of profits. If this condition were relaxed, the IRS
might get thousands more applications from for-profit firms seek-
ing Section 501(c)(3) tax breaks. This is not just a quantity effect.
For-profit firms have a profit incentive to stretch the definition of
"charitable" to encompass their activities even when they are
probably not charitable. For example, Toyota might seek the ex-
emption for its sale of a hybrid car, or Pfizer might seek the exemp-
tion because its researchers carry on some basic scientific research.
This would swamp the IRS and drain government coffers of money
for public goods that are better or at least more dependent on gov-
ernment funding. From this perspective, the nondistribution con-
straint could be analogized to a cap on attorney fees to discourage
baseless litigation.54
Yet it appears to us that there is a more direct solution to the
problem of abusive applications than the nondistribution con-
straint: charge an application fee. If an organization, whether non-
profit or for-profit, seeks Section 501(c)(3) status and its applica-
tion cannot be approved with a cursory review, then charge a fee
for the review. Alternatively, require an organization to pay the
IRS's legal fees if it challenges the IRS's denial of Section 501(c)(3)
status. This will discourage abusive applicants but allow nonabu-
sive for-profit applicants who engage in the same activities as cur-
rent nonprofit charities. This solution makes more sense because
while distribution of profits may predict abuse, it is neither a neces-
sary nor sufficient condition for abusive applications. A better cor-
relate of abuse is an actual IRS decision about the organization's
activities. If the IRS charges applicants the cost of its review, then
53 See, e.g., Fed. Pharmacy Serv. v. Comm'r, 625 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1980) (denying
nonprofit pharmacy § 501(c)(3) nonprofit status and tax exemption because sale of
prescription drugs is "presumptively commercial"); Sioux Valley Hosp. Ass'n v. S.D.
State Bd. of Equalization, 513 N.W.2d 562 (S.D. 1994) (denying hospital-run fitness
center that sold memberships § 501(c)(3) nonprofit status).
14 Professor David Schizer raises this objection in The Charitable Deduction and the
Private Pursuit of Public Goals 38-39 (July 30, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the Virginia Law Review Association).
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it should be indifferent to even abusive applications because it does
not bear the cost of that review.
Another alternative is for Congress to amend Section 501(c)(3)
to flesh out the definition of "charitable" activities or for the IRS
to issue ex ante regulations spelling out exclusively which activities
qualify as charitable activities and which do not. This would signal
to potentially abusive applicants that there is little return to apply-
ing for an exemption. After all, the reason Section 501(c)(3) is an
attractive nuisance is that it is ambiguous. The most direct remedy
for an attractive nuisance is to clean up the nuisance, not to punish
those attracted by it.
F. Inefficiencies Resulting from Coupling
If we are correct that no good theory explains the coupling of tax
subsidies for community-benefit activities and the nonprofit form,
then it follows that current law generates inefficiencies. We briefly
survey here the two main sources of inefficiency.
First, coupling encourages inefficient production by rewarding
nonaltruistic entrepreneurs who take nonprofit status. Suppose
there are three types of entrepreneurs: altruists, efficient nonaltru-
ists, and inefficient nonaltruists. Among the last two, assume that
the efficient nonaltruist and the inefficient nonaltruist are identical
in all respects except that the inefficient nonaltruist has higher
production costs. Finally, assume that the quality of the product is
verifiable. The efficient nonaltruist will choose the for-profit form
so that she can receive the full return on her investment; she does
not need to use the nonprofit form because there is no need to as-
sure the consumer of the quality of a product when quality is veri-
fiable. The inefficient nonaltruist, however, has an incentive to
choose the nonprofit form purely because of its tax advantage.
Without the tax advantage, the inefficient nonaltruist would not be
able to survive in a competitive marketplace. With that advantage,
she can not only survive but thereby earn a competitive salary."
55 If the nonprofit entrepreneur can also extract profits by drawing perquisites in
addition to a competitive salary, then even some marginally efficient but nonaltruistic
entrepreneurs will be drawn to the nonprofit form. The reason is that they will be able
to supplement their competitive income with perquisites subsidized by nonprofit tax
breaks.
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But because the inefficient nonaltruist has higher-than-competitive
costs without the tax advantage, the tax advantage simply subsi-
dizes inefficient production.
Second, current nonprofit law discourages talented altruists from
establishing charitable enterprises, causing them at the margin to
throw in their lot with commercial firms. To see why, recall that the
entrepreneur in the original model is both altruistic and self-
interested in the sense that she cares about income. Imagine that a
particular entrepreneur also is highly talented. In a world in which
successful charitable organizations need donors, and donors can
receive tax deductions only by donating to qualified nonprofit or-
ganizations, the highly talented and altruistic entrepreneur can op-
erate a charitable organization only if she is willing to take a large
pay cut relative to what she could receive in the commercial sector.
The reason for this is that the IRS enforces the nondistribution
constraint by insisting that the entrepreneur receive no more than
would a comparable employee in the commercial sector. But a
highly talented entrepreneur would have difficulty proving that her
market compensation is higher than that of comparable employees
in the commercial sector. This may explain why many entrepre-
neurs devote their early life to amassing wealth in commerce and
then start foundations only after they retire. It would be better if
these entrepreneurs could amass wealth early in life while helping
others by establishing successful for-profit charitable institutions.
An underlying theme of this Essay is that nonprofit firms are less
efficient than for-profit firms and that if the law permitted for-
profit firms to compete in charitable markets, charitable activity
would become more efficient. A natural response to this line of
reasoning is the efficiency gains from competition with for-profits
can be achieved simply with competition among nonprofits. The
logic is that competition for donations already encourages nonprof-
its to reduce administrative expenses and that further competition
from for-profits will yield few additional cost savings. While we fa-
vor competition among nonprofits, we do not think it will achieve
all the benefits that competition with for-profits can provide.
First, competition for donations among nonprofits only operates
as a serious incentive for cost-control in the range of insolvency.
Only when costs are so high that a nonprofit charity is about to be
dissolved is the manager's job truly threatened. Only then must she
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act to improve the performance of the organization. Another way
to put this is that there may not be sufficient competition among
nonprofits to achieve the gains that further competition from for-
profits might encourage. Second, if the objection is correct, it must
be that nonprofits are very efficient. Yet the study by former Sena-
tor Bradley and consultants from McKinsey & Company suggest
otherwise. They find that the nonprofit sector wastes $100 billion
of value annually.56 This confirms our intuition that it is generally
difficult to prove the claim that more competition is worse,
whether or not that competition comes from for-profit firms. Fi-
nally, competition among nonprofits only reduces administrative
costs, holding talent fixed. The second inefficiency we attribute to
coupling-discouraging talented altruists from starting charities-
cannot be addressed by competition among nonprofits because, re-
gardless of the level of competition, nonprofits cannot offer wages
that compete with for-profit firms in noncharitable sectors. The
only way to improve talent in the sector, and to obtain the associ-
ated improvements in efficiency, is to offer for-profit wages.
III. DOES EXISTING LAW ALREADY PERMIT DECOUPLING?
One objection to our argument is that entrepreneurs who want
to create for-profit charities that will benefit from tax subsidies can
do so under current law by engaging in sophisticated legal manipu-
lation. If this objection is correct, then it is not necessary to change
the law. In addition, if this objection is correct, it may suggest that
the rarity of for-profit charities shows that for-profit charities actu-
ally are not viable-they have hidden inefficiencies or offend po-
tential donors. However, we do not believe that this objection is
correct.
Suppose that an entrepreneur wants to establish a charity that
helps sick children in Africa and also knows that her own incen-
tives will be optimal if the charity is for-profit rather than non-
profit. To see how this might work, recall the example of a non-
profit museum that has a for-profit subsidiary that arranges to
lease out its gallery space for corporate parties. Donors to the mu-
seum receive tax benefits even though the private event subsidiary
makes profits. The reason is that all of that subsidiary's profits
6 Bradley et al., supra note 8.
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must be used by the museum for charitable ends and cannot be dis-
tributed to the people who control the museum's activities.
Now return to the charitable entrepreneur who believes that the
for-profit form would be most efficient for her charitable firm.
Can't she simply set up a nonprofit shell, which wholly owns the
for-profit core, which would then have optimal incentives to dis-
tribute the charity? Imagine that the for-profit subsidiary receives
the donations collected by the nonprofit shell, distributes the dona-
tions to the beneficiaries, and obtains "profits" equal to the differ-
ence between the fraction of the donor's dollar that are, by con-
tract, assigned to overhead expenses and the fraction actually used
for overhead expenses. For example, the "donation contract" pro-
vides that eighty cents on the dollar will reach beneficiaries, and be
confirmed by an independent audit, and that the for-profit core will
be allowed to keep any portion of the twenty-cent balance that is
not necessary for expenses.
The defect in this solution is easily seen. Because the nonprofit
shell cannot distribute the profits from the for-profit core to its
managers, the manager of the nonprofit shell does not have proper
incentives to select efficient managers for the for-profit core or to
monitor these managers to ensure that they do not shirk. More-
over, if the for-profit core is really doing all the work within the
nonprofit shell, the IRS is likely to call the shell a sham and with-
draw the shell's tax benefits.
But why then does the museum choose the for-profit form for its
private event subsidiary? Perhaps the purpose is to improve the in-
centives of the subsidiary's manager, though that subsidiary is so
small that it is unlikely to use much incentive pay. The more likely
reason is that, because of the unrelated business income tax, the
nonprofit museum is taxed just as a for-profit museum would be on
the profits from its private event activities. Organizing the subsidi-
ary as a for-profit entity simplifies the accounting for purposes of
calculating the tax.
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IV. COMMUNITY-BENEFIT ENTERPRISES, CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY, AND MIXED CHARITIES
A. Community-Benefit Enterprises
In our discussion so far, we have relied on a simplified depiction
of the law and of nonprofits in order to keep the exposition as clear
as possible. In doing so, we have neglected an important class of
nonprofits, and here we address it.
We have generally assumed a firm with three actors: an entre-
preneur, a donor, and a beneficiary. In fact, many nonprofits in-
volve just two actors: an entrepreneur and a consumer. Consider,
for example, a nonprofit hospital. The patient is the consumer, and
the owner of the hospital is the entrepreneur. There is no benefici-
ary. Museums and schools have a similar structure. Although peo-
ple can and do make donations to these institutions, donations play
a relatively small role in financing their operations. (Universities
are a special case. They rely heavily on both the consumer-the
student who pays tuition-and the donor-usually an alumnus.)
All of these institutions are entitled to nonprofit status under
both state and federal law, though the precise boundaries on the
activities of nonprofits may vary across state and federal law." All
of these institutions are eligible for both state and federal tax
breaks, though firms such as hospitals and museums that do not at-
tract many donations obtain little benefit from the tax deduction
for charitable contributions. Although our discussion thus far has
focused on the three-actor firm, the force of our argument extends
to the two-actor firm as well.
To help us state this point more precisely, Table 3 provides a
simply typology of the activities of firms, the organization of
firms, and the tax treatment of firms. There are three dimensions
along which to describe firms. One is nonprofit status. The defin-
ing feature of all nonprofit firms is that they are barred from dis-
'
7For example, compare Ind. Code Ann. § 23-17-21-2 (1999) (allowing nonprofit
corporations to "make distributions to and confer benefits on a member or an affiliate
that is a governmental entity ... or a member or affiliate that is another nonprofit" in
some circumstances), with Mont. Code Ann. §§ 35-2-1401 to -1402 (2005) (prohibiting
all distributions except for certain membership repurchases). These can be contrasted
with § 501(c)(3) of federal tax code, which limits tax breaks to nonprofit firms that
engage in, for example, "religious, charitable, scientific,... literary, or educational"
activities.
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tributing profits to owners, employees, or otherwise affiliated per-
sons. For-profit firms have no such limit (though they can con-
tract to forgo profits). A second dimension along which to de-
scribe firms is whether they engage in "community-benefit" (or
public-benefit") activities. The unifying feature of community-
benefit activities (row A) is that, as the name suggests, they are
thought to benefit the community and not just the person paying
for the activity. The distinction is relevant to our discussion be-
cause only nonprofits that engage in community-benefit activities
are eligible for state and federal tax breaks (row E). The third
dimension along which to describe firms is whether they involve
three actors or two actors. In theory, both three-actor and two-
actor firms can engage in community-benefit activities. In prac-
tice, however, three-actor firms-firms with a separate donor and
beneficiary as opposed to a single consumer-are found only en-
gaging in community-benefit activities. In our discussions to this
point, we have called the three-actor firm a "charity"59 (row C).
For contrast, Table 3 labels two-actor firms "commercial" firms.
60
To summarize, firms may engage in two categories of activities,
community-benefit or not. Among community-benefit organiza-
tions there are two types of firm, charitable (column 1) and com-
mercial firms (column 2). Among noncommunity-benefit firms,
there are only commercial firms (column 3).
" "Community-benefit" and "public-benefit" are terms used occasionally in state
statutes and not at all in § 501(c)(3). However, these are terms used frequently in ju-
dicial opinions on both state and federal law. Moreover, when these terms are used,
they are thought to correspond quite closely to the precise list of activities in state
codes and § 501(c)(3) that are eligible for favorable tax treatment. See, e.g., Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591-92 (1983); IHC Health Plans v.
Comm'r, 325 F.3d 1188, 1194 n.9, 1197-98 (10th Cir. 2003); McCoy v. E. Tex. Med.
Ctr. Reg'l Healthcare Sys., 388 F. Supp. 2d 760, 769 (E.D. Tex. 2005); Amato v.
UPMC, 371 F. Supp. 2d 752, 757 (W.D. Pa. 2005); Mingledorff v. Vaughan Reg'l Med.
Ctr., 682 So. 2d 415, 418 (Ala. 1996); see also Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117 (espe-
cially "Situation 2").
" Other scholars have called these firms "donative" firms. See, e.g., Henry B.
Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 497, 502
(1981).
' This is consistent with Hansmann's usage. See id.
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Table 3. Distinguishing features of nonprofit firms.
(1) (2) (3)
A) Community- Community Community Not community
benefit activity? ------------.benefit -------------- benefit .............. benefit -------
B) Public good? Yes Generally, yes Generally, no
C) Charitable or Charitable Commercial Commercial
commercial?
D) Donors and Yes Generally, no No
donations?
Churches, soup Healthcare Retail sales, car
kitchens, medical facilities, manufacturing,
E) Examples charities, United childeare mauting,
Way, Red Cross facilities, schools pharmaceuticals
F) Nonprofit
presence?
G) Tax breaks for
nonprofits?
H) For-profit
presence?
I) Tax break for
for-profits?
Rare Generally, yes
Incidental
Yes
The critical observation motivating this Essay is that, aside from
the recent entry of Google, there are no important for-profit firms
that operate charities (see row H).6 We believe that this is the re-
sult of the discriminatory tax treatment of for-profit firms. More
precisely, although nonprofit firms that engage in community-
benefit activities are eligible for certain tax breaks, for-profit firms
that engage in even the core of community-benefit activities-
charity-are not eligible for these tax breaks (see row I). Our con-
tention is not merely that this discriminatory treatment explains
the dearth of for-profit charities, but that it reduces social welfare
by increasing the overall cost of charitable activities.
" For-profit firms may make charitable contributions, but hardly any primarily
channel third-party donations to beneficiaries. For example, the investment firms
Fidelity and Merrill Lynch have donor services that link individual donors to
nonprofit charitable foundations and take a share of the finder's fee. But they do
not directly conduct charitable activities. See Jill Lerner, Merrill Makes Debut in
Charitable Fund Niche, Boston Bus. J., May 30, 2003, available at
http://boston.biijournals.com/boston/stories/2003/06/02/story4.html.
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Until now, the discussion in this Essay has focused on column 1
and charities. Because the logic of our arguments does not depend
on whether a firm is a charity, our normative claim applies with
equal force to column 2-commercial firms that engage in commu-
nity-benefit activities. In other words, the tax treatment of commu-
nity-benefit activities by commercial firms should not depend on
whether they are nonprofit or for-profit. To the extent that "com-
munity-benefit" is a synonym for "public good" (row B), we can
even go beyond mere nondiscrimination and assert that for-profit
commercial firms engaging in community-benefit activities deserve
the same tax breaks reserved for nonprofit commercial firms en-
gaging in such activities. Accordingly, for-profit hospitals and
schools deserve the same tax breaks as nonprofit hospitals and
schools. Indeed, because there is greater competition between
commercial nonprofit and for-profit firms engaging in community-
benefit activities, the elimination of discriminatory tax treatment
may have a larger effect for these firms than for charities. The rea-
son is either that consumers place sufficient value on contractible
quality and efficiency or that aggregate demand outstrips the ca-
pacity of efficient altruists.
Table 3 also highlights an enlightening correspondence between
our claim and the rationale behind the unrelated business income
tax ("UBIT"). As row F indicates, nonprofits generally do not
compete directly with for-profits outside of community-benefit
markets. There is some competition, as when a nonprofit museum
has a division that leases out its gallery space for private parties or
a university leases its athletic stadium to a local professional sports
team. But those activities are limited in part because the UBIT lim-
its the nonprofit tax exemption to non-community-benefit activities
that are "substantially related" to the nonprofit's purpose." The
purpose of the UBIT was substantially to eliminate tax discrimina-
tion against for-profits competing against nonprofits in non-
community-benefit markets. That is, the purpose was to align the
62 See Evelyn Brody, Business Activities of Nonprofit Organizations: Legal Bound-
ary Problems, in Nonprofits and Business: A New World of Innovation and Adapta-
tion (C. Eugene Steuerle and Joseph Cordes eds., forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at
1-2, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). Examples of qualifying and
thus exempt activities are the nonprofit museum's gift shop or the nonprofit univer-
sity's bookstore.
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two shaded cells in column 3. For comparison, this Essay makes an
argument for aligning the analogously shaded cells in columns 1
and 2.
B. Corporate Responsibility and Mixed Charities
Our conclusions have larger significance for the increasingly im-
portant phenomenon of "corporate responsibility." Corporate re-
sponsibility refers to the practice of many corporations of donating
money or services to a charitable cause or refraining from profit-
able activities that offend moral sensibilities. Firms in the first
category include McDonald's, which provides in-kind grants to
Ronald McDonald House, an independent charity,6 and the many
firms that donated money and services to victims of the Katrina
hurricane disaster.64 Firms in the second category include Nike and
other clothing manufacturers, which avoid purchasing supplies
from sweatshops in foreign countries even though those sweat-
shops comply with local law; Time Warner and many other compa-
nies that support the arts; PricewaterhouseCoopers and other firms
that refuse to do business with repressive regimes such as the gov-
ernment of Myanmar; and Starbucks, Whole Foods, and other re-
tailers that purchase supplies from farmers who use ecologically
61benign production methods or who are poor. We will call the sec-
ond category of firms "mixed charities." This category is our pre-
sent focus. We argue that just as "pure" for-profit charitable firms
63 See Ronald McDonald House Charities, About Us, httpJ/www.rmhc.org/rmhc/index/
about.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2007).
6 See CNNMoney.com, Companies Pitch In, Sept. 15, 2005, http://money.cnn.com/
2005/08/31/news/fortune5OO/firms-hurricane/ (listing dozens of firms that gave mil-
lions of dollars in charity, both in cash and in kind, for hurricane relief aid).65 These firms and many others have web pages devoted to corporate responsibility. See,
e.g., McDonald's Corporation, Our Values, http://www.mcdonalds.com/corp/values.html
(last visited Aug. 24, 2007); Nikebiz, Responsibility, http://www.nike.com/
nikebiz/nikebiz.jhtml?page=29 (last visited Aug. 24, 2007); PricewaterhouseCoop-
ers, Corporate Citizenship, http://www.pwc.com/extweb/newcoatwork.nsf/docid/
1AB4D9C5A057936B80256C2A003C26DD (last visited Aug. 24, 2007); Starbucks, Cor-
porate Social Responsibility, http://www.starbucks.com/aboutus/csr.asp (last visited
Aug. 24, 2007); Time Warner, Active Corporate Citizens in a Global Community,
http://www.timewarner.com/corp/citizenship/index.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2007);
The Walt Disney Company, Corporate Responsibility, http://corporate.disney.go.com/
corporate/corporate-responsibility.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2007).
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should receive the Section 501(c)(3) tax benefits, so should for-
profit mixed charities, to the extent of their charitable activity.
The argument is based on the assumption that some commercial
and charitable operations are likely to benefit from economies of
scope-they can be provided more cheaply by the same firm than
by separate firms. Suppose that many people believe that poor
third-world coffee farmers should receive aid. Currently, a donor
can help these farmers by contributing to a pure nonprofit charity,
which would then give cash or in-kind help to the farmers. In addi-
tion, a donor can help these farmers by purchasing their products
from Starbucks and other stores even though the quality-adjusted
price of their coffee beans is higher than the price of comparable
beans produced by large commercial operations. However, because
Starbucks is a for-profit firm, the purchaser of the beans cannot
take a tax deduction for the portion of the price that is attributable
to the donation (as opposed to the portion that is attributable to
the consumption value of the good). This creates a distortion: peo-
ple will prefer to donate to the pure charity in order to obtain the
tax benefit when there is no reason to think that the pure charity
produces a greater social benefit than Starbucks. Indeed, to the ex-
tent that Starbucks can exploit economies of scope from combining
its charitable projects and its commercial coffee bean purchasing
operations, the tax subsidy pushes donations from the more effi-
cient charity to the less efficient charity. In sum, if economies of
scope are substantial, as they surely are in some cases, then cou-
pling tax breaks and nonprofit status interferes with the efficient
production of charitable goods.
There are two main objections to this argument. First, allowing
commercial firms to offer tax advantages to consumers whose dol-
lars partially fund charitable activities might seem administratively
complex. Starbucks would need to give customers a receipt that
distinguishes the charitable and commercial components of the
price. If a bag of fair trade coffee beans costs $10 and comparable
nonfair beans cost $9, then the receipt should show a $1 donation.
The customer could use the receipt as evidence for deductions
claimed on her tax return. (Starbucks could also keep track of this
information and send customers annual statements.) Meanwhile,
Starbucks would need to prove to the IRS that the customer's
beans were purchased from a qualified entity. This would also re-
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quire extensive recordkeeping. We are agnostic as to whether the
benefits justify these administrative costs; however, we should
point out that this type of recordkeeping is quite common in re-
lated contexts. For example, charities frequently invite donors to
dinner receptions, charge them $W, and then provide a receipt that
shows that some portion of the $W price was used to pay for a ser-
vice (the dinner) and is thus not tax deductible. Given this reality,
the administrative costs of our scheme are not likely to be exces-
sive.
Second, many people argue that firms like Starbucks do not en-
gage in "real" charity; their apparently charitable activity is simply
a cynical marketing gimmick. Indeed, managers of firms have a
duty to maximize the profits of shareholders, and if they really
meant to give away the firm's money, they could be sued. There-
fore, it cannot be the case that managers are acting altruistically,
and if they are not, then firms should not obtain additional tax
benefits.
This argument, however, is seriously mistaken. What matters is
not the firms' motive but the effect of their behavior. To under-
stand why, imagine that Starbucks can increase its profits by ex-
actly the same amount in two ways. First, it can invest in expensive
billboards that will bring more customers to its stores. Second, it
can provide donations to fair-trade farmers while publicizing this
activity, which will bring the same number of customers to its
stores as the billboards. Each investment costs $X, while bringing
in an additional Y customers, who generate increased profits of $Z
each, where Y x $Z > $X.
Assuming that people generally care about the well-being of
farmers, while being indifferent to the existence of billboards, it
makes sense to subsidize Starbucks's fair-trade campaign while not
subsidizing the billboard campaign. It does not matter whether
Starbucks (or its managers or shareholders) acts from altruistic or
selfish motives; what matters is that the resulting activity produces
social benefits. This, of course, is a general point, one that applies
to all firms that engage in socially desirable behavior.
CONCLUSION: A PROPOSAL
Existing theories of nonprofit status are not persuasive justifica-
tions for coupling the nonprofit form and tax breaks for commu-
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nity-benefit activities. The government should not condition such
breaks on taking the nonprofit form, that is, complying with the
nondistribution constraint. Exclusively subsidizing this form dis-
torts entrepreneurs' incentives and encourages inefficient produc-
tion. We do not take a position on whether governments should
subsidize community-benefit activities undertaken by firms; rather
our point is that if government subsidizes such activities, then the
subsidies should be available to for-profit as well as nonprofit
firms. This is the case for for-profit charities, and indeed more gen-
erally for nondiscrimination against all community-benefit activi-
ties by for-profits.
If this reform is too bold to be embraced by policymakers or
scholars, we propose a more modest reform that accomplishes
some of the goals of decoupling. Currently, the IRS does not per-
mit managers who exercise control over a nonprofit to receive in-
centive pay keyed to the profits, to the revenues, or perhaps even
to the costs of operating the organization. If the IRS relaxed this
restriction, then it could allow nonprofit organizations to give
managers with control an incentive to be more efficient. So long as
the IRS does not entirely do away with the restriction-permitting
sharing of only a fixed fraction of profits-or allows distributions
to those in control but does not allow distributions to shareholders,
this reform is not tantamount to full decoupling. Rather, it allows
nonprofits to use some of the incentives that for-profit firms are
permitted to use. In short, if one is uncomfortable with giving for-
profits access to nonprofits' tax breaks, a compromise may be to al-
low nonprofits to access for-profits' incentives.
To those who remain skeptical, we note that there is an impor-
tant and growing area where the law already permits decoupling:
socially responsible investing. Today there are numerous financial
funds that invest only in socially responsible companies. Invest-
6Workers that do not exercise control over the organization, such as devel-
opment officers at universities and, more recently, certain doctors in hospitals,
may obtain incentive pay keyed to how much funds they raise or how well they
control health care costs. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200601030 (Oct. 12,
2005); John R. Washlick & John A. Knapp, Hospital/Physician Gainsharing Ar-
rangements: Dead or Alive? (Mar. 1, 2000), http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/
E3554EA7-2713-4143-AF6F68C7010392B0_Publication.pdf.
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ment in these funds has increased ten-fold in the last ten years67
and now accounts for over ten percent of all assets under manage-
ment.6 The benefit of investing in these funds is that they promote
socially worthy causes. The cost is that these funds often earn a
lower rate of return than funds that have no restrictions on the tar-
gets of their investment. An alternative to investing in these funds
is to invest in an unrestricted fund and donate part of one's gains to
charities. The latter yields a tax deduction for the donor and a tax
exemption for the charity so long as it is nonprofit. But socially re-
sponsible investing yields the exact same tax benefits even if the
firm running the socially responsible fund is for-profit. The reason
is that the socially responsible fund's contribution to social causes
is equal to the reduction in its rate of return. The reduction lowers
the investor's gains, which is equivalent to a tax deduction because
it directly lowers her income. It also lowers the profits of the firm
operating the fund, which is equivalent to a tax exemption for that
firm. No one, at present, seems to worry that managers of socially
responsible funds are driven by their profit incentive to shade in-
vestments from more worthy to more profitable firms-even
though they face the exact same incentives as the managers of our
hypothetical for-profit charity. If one is comfortable with the cur-
rent tax treatment of socially responsible investing, we contend
that one ought to be comfortable with decoupling more generally.
If our fundamental point that coupling distorts firms' incentives
is correct, a natural question is why the law currently grants a tax
break to nonprofit firms that is not available to for-profit firms.
One possible reason is historical accident, but the staying power of
this error might be due, we think, to a pervasive confusion in the
public mind about motivation and effect. An intuitive view is that
nonprofit firms deserve a tax subsidy because nonprofit entrepre-
neurs are altruistic, whereas for-profit entrepreneurs are greedy-a
view reflected in the commonly held notion that corporations en-
gage in charitable activities only for self-interested marketing rea-
sons. But the nonprofit form, by conferring tax advantages, appeals
to nonaltruists as well as altruists. The only way for the law to en-
67 Social Investment Forum, 2005 Report on Socially Responsible Investing Trends
in the United States: 10-Year Review, at iv (2006), http://www.socialinvest.org/
areas/research/trends/sri trends-report 2005.pdf.
" See supra text accompanying note 11.
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courage truly altruistic behavior-that is, behavior motivated by a
concern for others, not by a concern for oneself-is by not reward-
ing it.69 The relevant consideration for the law is not whether the
entrepreneur is altruistic but whether the effect of the entrepre-
neur's action is socially beneficial. If it is socially beneficial, and if
ordinary market forces do not provide sufficient incentive for peo-
ple to engage in that action, then a subsidy may be appropriate.
Because the effect of the entrepreneur's behavior is unrelated to
her incentives to choose between the nonprofit or for-profit form,
the choice of form does not provide grounds for a tax subsidy.
69 Cf. Richard Morris Titmuss, The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social
Policy 200-18 (Ann Oakley & John Ashton eds., expanded ed. 1997) (arguing that
voluntary blood donation is superior to commercializing blood transfer on public pol-
icy grounds).
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